IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25914.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Specter of the Giant Three

Author

Listed:
  • Lucian A. Bebchuk
  • Scott Hirst

Abstract

This paper examines the large, steady, and continuing growth of the Big Three index fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors. We show that there is a real prospect that index funds will continue to grow, and that voting in most significant public companies will come to be dominated by the future “Giant Three.” We begin by analyzing the drivers of the rise of the Big Three, including the structural factors that are leading to the heavy concentration of the index funds sector. We then provide empirical evidence about the past growth and current status of the Big Three, and their likely growth into the Giant Three. Among other things, we document that the Big Three have almost quadrupled their collective ownership stake in S&P 500 companies over the past two decades; that they have captured the overwhelming majority of the inflows into the asset management industry over the past decade; that each of them now manages 5% or more of the shares in a vast number of public companies; and that they collectively cast an average of about 25% of the votes at S&P 500 companies. We then extrapolate from past trends to estimate the future growth of the Big Three. We estimate that the Big Three could well cast as much as 40% of the votes in S&P 500 companies within two decades. Policymakers and others must recognize—and must take seriously—the prospect of a Giant Three scenario. The plausibility of this scenario makes it important to understand the incentives of index fund managers, a topic that we study in other work.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, 2019. "The Specter of the Giant Three," NBER Working Papers 25914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25914
    Note: CF LE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w25914.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cohen, Shira & Kadach, Igor & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Reichelstein, Stefan, 2022. "Executive compensation tied to ESG performance: International evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-051, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Song, Xiaochuan, 2023. "Gender-based CEO transitions: The role of the Big Three," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    3. Leruth, Luc & Mazarei, Adnan & Regibeau, Pierre & Renneboog, Luc, 2022. "Green Energy Depends on Critical Minerals. Who Controls the Supply Chains?," Discussion Paper 2022-024, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Azar, José & Duro, Miguel & Kadach, Igor, 2020. "The Big Three and Corporate Carbon Emissions Around the World," CEPR Discussion Papers 15522, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Jiang, Yahan & Wang, Cai & Li, Sha & Wan, Jing, 2022. "Do institutional investors' corporate site visits improve ESG performance? Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    6. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    7. Antón, Miguel & Azar, José & Gine, Mireia & Lin, Luca X., 2022. "Beyond the target: M&A decisions and rival ownership," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 44-66.
    8. Ringe Wolf-Georg, 2023. "Investor Empowerment for Sustainability," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 74(1), pages 21-52, April.
    9. Beni Lauterbach & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2020. "The Effect of Institutional Investors’ Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 1-33, February.
    10. Wilson, Christian & Caldecott, Ben, 2023. "Investigating the role of passive funds in carbon-intensive capital markets: Evidence from U.S. bonds," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    11. Tristan Auvray & Cédric Durand & Joel Rabinovich & Cecilia Rikap, 2021. "Corporate financialization’s conservation and transformation: from Mark I to Mark II," Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 431-457, December.
    12. Tristan Auvray & Cédric Durand & Joel Rabinovich & Cecilia Rikap, 2020. "Financialization's conservation and transformation: from Mark I to Mark II," CEPN Working Papers hal-03079425, HAL.
    13. Tristan Auvray & Cédric Durand & Joel Rabinovich & Cecilia Rikap, 2020. "Financialization's conservation and transformation: from Mark I to Mark II," Working Papers hal-03079425, HAL.
    14. Qiu, Zhigang & Wang, Yanyi & Zhang, Shunming, 2023. "Market power, ambiguity, and market participation," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    15. David Blitz & Laurens Swinkels, 2021. "Who owns tobacco stocks?," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(5), pages 311-325, September.
    16. Albina Gibadullina, 2024. "Who owns and controls global capital? Uneven geographies of asset manager capitalism," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 56(2), pages 558-585, March.
    17. Azar, José & Duro, Miguel & Kadach, Igor & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2021. "The Big Three and corporate carbon emissions around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 674-696.
    18. Alessio M. Pacces, 2021. "Will the EU Taxonomy Regulation Foster Sustainable Corporate Governance?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(21), pages 1-21, November.
    19. Siri Tronslien Sagbakken & Dan Zhang, 2022. "European sin stocks," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 1-18, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25914. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.