IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/25373.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Global Safe Asset for and from Emerging Market Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Markus K. Brunnermeier
  • Lunyang Huang

Abstract

This paper examines how a newly designed global safe asset can mitigate international capital flows induced by flight-to-safety. In the model domestic investors have to co-invest in a safe asset along with their physical capital. At times of crisis, investors replace the initially safe domestic government bonds with safe US Treasuries and re-sell part of their capital. The reduction in physical capital lowers GDP and tax revenue, leading to increased default risk justifying the loss of the government bond's safe-asset status. We compare two ways to mitigate this self-fulfilling scenario. In the “buffer approach” international reserve holding reduces the severity of a crisis. In the “rechannelling approach” flight-to-safety capital flows are rechannelled from international cross-border flows to flows across two EME asset classes. The two asset classes are the senior and junior bond of tranched portfolio of EME sovereign bonds.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lunyang Huang, 2018. "A Global Safe Asset for and from Emerging Market Economies," NBER Working Papers 25373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25373
    Note: AP CF IFM ME
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w25373.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    2. Ricardo J. Caballero & Emmanuel Farhi & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, 2017. "The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 29-46, Summer.
    3. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
    4. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    5. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    6. Gary Gorton & Stefan Lewellen & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "The Safe-Asset Share," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 101-106, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ryan Chahrour & Rosen Valchev, 2024. "The Dollar in an Era of International Retrenchment," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 72(3), pages 1042-1080, September.
    2. Corsetti, G. & Maeng, S. H., 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2370, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Tilman Bletzinger & William Greif & Bernd Schwaab, 2022. "Can EU Bonds Serve as Euro-Denominated Safe Assets?," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-13, November.
    4. Brunnermeier, Markus, 2019. "A Crash Course on the Euro Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 14016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Michael David Bordo, 2021. "Monetary Policy Cooperation/Coordination and Global Financial Crises in Historical Perspective," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 587-611, July.
    6. Janus, Jakub, 2021. "The COVID-19 shock and long-term interest rates in emerging market economies," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    7. Janus, Jakub, 2022. "Cross-border flights to safe assets in bond markets: evidence from emerging market economies," MPRA Paper 113875, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Janus, Jakub, 2023. "Flights to safe assets in bond markets: Evidence from emerging market economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    9. Cronin, David & Dunne, Peter G., 2019. "How effective are sovereign bond-backed securities as a spillover prevention device?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-66.
    10. Janse Kalin Anev, 2023. "Developing European Safe Assets," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Sciendo, vol. 58(6), pages 315-319, December.
    11. Corsetti, G. & Maeng, S. H., 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2319, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Giancarlo Corsetti & Seung Hyun Maeng, 2023. "The Theory of Reserve Accumulation, Revisited," RSCAS Working Papers 2013_53, European University Institute.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mr. Anil Ari & Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2018. "Debt Seniority and Sovereign Debt Crises," IMF Working Papers 2018/104, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sebastian, Sannikov, Yuliy Merkel & Sebastian Merkel, 2021. "Debt as Safe Asset," CESifo Working Paper Series 9500, CESifo.
    3. Occhino, Filippo, 2017. "The 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB’s OMT program: A debt-overhang banking and sovereign crisis interpretation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 337-363.
    4. Le Grand, François & Ragot, Xavier, 2021. "Sovereign default and liquidity: The case for a world safe asset," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    5. Anil Ari, 2015. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 202, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    6. Nicolas Caramp & Sanjay R Singh, 2023. "Bond Premium Cyclicality and Liquidity Traps," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(6), pages 2822-2879.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sebastian Merkel & Yuliy Sannikov, 2021. "A Safe-Asset Perspective for an Integrated Policy Framework," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Steven J Davis & Edward S Robinson & Bernard Yeung (ed.), THE ASIAN MONETARY POLICY FORUM Insights for Central Banking, chapter 8, pages 302-332, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Rojas, Luis E. & Thaler, Dominik, 2023. "The bright side of the doom loop: banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives," Working Paper Series 2869, European Central Bank.
    9. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.
    10. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    11. Cornand, Camille & Gandré, Pauline & Gimet, Céline, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 445-469.
    12. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    13. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    14. Chanelle Duley & Prasanna Gai, 2020. "When the penny doesn't drop - Macroeconomic tail risk and currency crises," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 520, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    15. Corsetti, G. & Erce, A. & Uy, T., 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1730, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    17. Massimo Amato & Everardo Belloni & Carlo A. Favero & Lucio Gobbi & Francesco Saraceno, 2024. "Stabilising market expectations through a market tool: a proposal for an enhanced TPI," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 41(2), pages 597-615, July.
    18. Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2019. "Slow Moving Debt Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3229-3263, September.
    19. Joao Ayres & Gaston Navarro & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Pedro Teles, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises with Long Stagnations," Working Papers 757, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    20. Hefeker, Carsten, 2004. "Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime," HWWA Discussion Papers 298, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.