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Political Discretion and Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Assassination of President McKinley

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  • Richard B. Baker
  • Carola Frydman
  • Eric Hilt

Abstract

We study the importance of discretion in antitrust enforcement by analyzing the response of asset prices to the sudden accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency. During McKinley’s term in office the largest wave of merger activity in American history occurred, and his administration did not attempt to use antitrust laws to restrain any of those mergers. His vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, was known to be a Progressive reformer and much more interested in controlling anticompetitive behavior. We find that firms with greater vulnerability to antitrust enforcement saw greater declines in their abnormal returns following McKinley’s assassination. The transition from McKinley to Roosevelt caused one of the most significant changes in antitrust enforcement of the Gilded Age—not from new legislation, but from a change in the approach taken to the enforcement of existing law. Our results highlight the importance of enforcement efforts in antitrust.

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  • Richard B. Baker & Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2018. "Political Discretion and Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Assassination of President McKinley," NBER Working Papers 25237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25237
    Note: CF DAE LE POL
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    1. Mariotti, Sergio & Marzano, Riccardo, 2021. "The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N31 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N81 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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