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Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records

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  • Kyle Bagwell
  • Robert W. Staiger
  • Ali Yurukoglu

Abstract

This paper empirically examines recently declassified data from the GATT/WTO on tariff bargaining. We document eight stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations. We use detailed product-level offer and counteroffer data to examine several questions about trade policy, including whether preferential tariffs were a stumbling block towards liberalization, and whether the relaxation of bilateral reciprocity to multilateral reciprocity aided liberalization. We organize the empirical analysis around a theoretical model of multi-party trade negotiations motivated by the terms-of-trade theory and respecting the institutional features of most-favored-nation status and reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger & Ali Yurukoglu, 2015. "Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records," NBER Working Papers 21488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21488
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga & Peri Silva, 2018. "Cooperation in WTO’s Tariff Waters?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1302-1338.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abe Dunn & Joshua D Gottlieb & Adam Hale Shapiro & Daniel J Sonnenstuhl & Pietro Tebaldi, 2024. "A Denial a Day Keeps the Doctor Away," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 139(1), pages 187-233.
    2. Daiqiang Zhang, 2021. "Testing Passive Versus Symmetric Beliefs In Contracting With Externalities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(2), pages 723-767, May.
    3. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, 2015. "The GATT's Starting Point: Tariff Levels circa 1947," NBER Working Papers 21782, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bown,Chad P. & Bown,Chad P., 2015. "What?s left for the WTO ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7502, The World Bank.
    6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2018. "Multilateral Trade Bargaining And Dominant Strategies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1785-1824, November.
    7. Bown,Chad P. & Crowley,Meredith A & Bown,Chad P. & Crowley,Meredith A, 2016. "The empirical landscape of trade policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7620, The World Bank.
    8. David P Byrne & Leslie A Martin & Jia Sheen Nah, 2023. "Price Discrimination by Negotiation: a Field Experiment in Retail Electricity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(4), pages 2499-2537.
    9. Olivier Bochet & Manshu Khanna & Simon Siegenthaler, 2024. "Beyond Dividing the Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(1), pages 163-191.
    10. David P Byrne & Leslie A Martin & Jia Sheen Nah, 2022. "Price Discrimination by Negotiation: a Field Experiment in Retail Electricity [“Redistribution through Markets,”]," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 137(4), pages 2499-2537.
    11. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    12. Ralph Ossa, 2016. "Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy," NBER Working Papers 22062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Dindaroglu, Burak & Ertac, Seda, 2024. "An empirical study of sequential offer bargaining during the Festival of Sacrifice," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    14. Matthew Backus & Tom Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2015. "Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation," NBER Working Papers 21285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. David P Byrne & Leslie A Martin & Jia Sheen Nah, 2023. "Price Discrimination by Negotiation: a Field Experiment in Retail Electricity," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 137(4), pages 2499-2537.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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