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Optimal Fiscal Limits

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  • Stephen Coate

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal design of fiscal limits in the context of a simple political economy model. The model features a single politician and a representative voter. The politician is responsible for choosing the level of public spending for the voter but may be biased in favor of spending. The voter sets a spending limit and requires that the politician have voter approval to exceed it. This limit must be set before the voter's preferences for public spending are fully known. The paper first solves for the optimal limit and explains how it depends upon the degree of politician bias and the nature of the uncertainty concerning the voter's preferred spending level. A dynamic version of the model is then analyzed and policies which limit the rate of growth of spending are shown to dominate those that cap spending to be below some fixed fraction of community income.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Coate, 2014. "Optimal Fiscal Limits," NBER Working Papers 20643, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20643
    Note: PE POL
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20643.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2011. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 82-112, August.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, October.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82.
    4. Leah Brooks & Yosh Halberstam & Justin Phillips, 2016. "Spending Within Limits: Evidence From Municipal Fiscal Restraints," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 69(2), pages 315-352, June.
    5. Cutler, David M. & Elmendorf, Douglas W. & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Restraining the Leviathan: property tax limitation in Massachusetts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 313-334, March.
    6. Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell, 2013. "The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1541-1599, July.
    7. Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J., 1997. "The effect of property tax limitation measures on local government fiscal behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 469-487, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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