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The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity

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  • Murray L. Aitken
  • Ernst R. Berndt
  • Barry Bosworth
  • Iain M. Cockburn
  • Richard Frank
  • Michael Kleinrock
  • Bradley T. Shapiro

Abstract

We examine six molecules facing initial loss of US exclusivity (LOE, from patent expiration or challenges) between June 2009 and May 2013 that were among the 50 most prescribed molecules in May 2013. We examine prices per day of therapy (from the perspective of average revenue received by retail pharmacy per day of therapy) and utilization separately for four payer types (cash, Medicare Part D, Medicaid, and other third party payer - TPP) and age under vs. 65 and older. We find that quantity substitutions away from the brand are much larger proportionately and more rapid than average price reductions during the first six months following initial LOE. Brands continue to raise prices after generics enter. Expansion of total molecule sales (brand plus generic) following LOE is an increasingly common phenomenon compared with earlier eras. The number of days of therapy in a prescription has generally increased over time. Generic penetration rates are typically highest and most rapid for TPPs, and lowest and slowest for Medicaid. Cash customers and seniors generally pay the highest prices for brands and generics, third party payers and those under 65 pay the lowest prices, with Medicaid and Medicare Part D in between. The presence of an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period has a significant impact on prices and volumes of prescriptions, but this varies across molecules.

Suggested Citation

  • Murray L. Aitken & Ernst R. Berndt & Barry Bosworth & Iain M. Cockburn & Richard Frank & Michael Kleinrock & Bradley T. Shapiro, 2013. "The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity," NBER Working Papers 19487, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19487
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    Cited by:

    1. Castanheira, Micael & Ornaghi, Carmine & Siotis, Georges, 2019. "The unexpected consequences of generic entry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Bradley T. Shapiro, 2016. "Estimating the cost of strategic entry delay in pharmaceuticals: The case of Ambien CR," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 201-231, September.
    3. Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, 2014. "Specialty drug prices and utilization after loss of U.S. patent exclusivity, 2001-2007," NBER Working Papers 20016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, 2016. "Specialty Drug Prices and Utilization after Loss of U.S. Patent Exclusivity, 2001–2007," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring and Modeling Health Care Costs, pages 273-321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ricardo Gonçalves & Vasco Rodrigues & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2015. "Reference pricing in the presence of pseudo-generics," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 281-305, September.
    6. Thierry Nianogo & Albert Okunade & Demba Fofana & Weiwei Chen, 2016. "Determinants of US Prescription Drug Utilization using County Level Data," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 606-619, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • L78 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Government Policy

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