Elections and the Quality of Public Officials: Evidence from U.S. State Courts
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2012-09-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-09-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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