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The Long-Term Effects of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Employment

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  • Johannes F. Schmieder
  • Till M. von Wachter
  • Stefan Bender

Abstract

The majority of papers analyzing the employment effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit durations focuses on the duration of the first unemployment spell. In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we use a regression discontinuity design to analyze the long-term effects of extensions in UI durations. These estimates differ from standard estimates that they incorporate differences in UI benefit receipt and employment due to recurrent unemployment spells. Second, we derive a welfare formula of UI extensions that incorporates recurrent nonemployment spells. We find that accounting for nonemployment beyond the initial spell leads to a significant reduction in estimates of the nonemployment effect of UI extensions by about 25 percent. We show this effect is only partly explained by a mechanical effect due to finite follow-up durations, and mainly arises from a lower probability of days in nonemployment in months after end of the initial nonemployment spell.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes F. Schmieder & Till M. von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2012. "The Long-Term Effects of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Employment," NBER Working Papers 17814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17814
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lemieux, Thomas & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2000. "Supply side hysteresis: the case of the Canadian unemployment insurance system," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 139-170, October.
    2. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
    3. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    4. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    5. Johannes F. Schmieder† & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2011. "The Effects Of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over The Business Cycle: Evidence From Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over Twenty Years," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-063, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Lalive & Camille Landais & Josef Zweimüller, 2015. "Market Externalities of Large Unemployment Insurance Extension Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(12), pages 3564-3596, December.
    2. Marianna Kudlyak & Damba Lkhagvasuren & Roman Sysuyev, 2012. "Sorting by skill over the course of job search," Working Paper 12-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    3. Le Barbanchon, Thomas, 2016. "The effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on unemployment exits to work and match quality in France," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 16-29.
    4. Landais, Camille & Michaillat, Pascal & Saez, Emmanuel, 2010. "Optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35596, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Arash Nekoei & Andrea Weber, 2017. "Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(2), pages 527-561, February.
    6. Nicholas Lawson, 2017. "Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 281-312, November.
    7. Amorim, Domingos Isaias Maia & Tabosa, Francisco José Silva & Almeida, Alexandre Nunes & Castelar, Pablo Urano de Carvalho, 2023. "The impact of unemployment insurance on reinsertion wages in 2015 in the rural environment of Brazil," Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural (RESR), Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural, vol. 61(1), January.
    8. Kohara, Miki & Sasaki, Masaru & Machikita, Tomohiro, 2013. "Is longer unemployment rewarded with longer job tenure?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 44-56.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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