Industry Dynamics: Foundations For Models with an Infinite Number of Firms
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- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1983. "Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. Part I: Mixed strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 153-170, June.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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