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Competing for Attention in Financial Markets

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  • Bruce Ian Carlin
  • Shaun William Davies
  • Andrew Miles Iannaccone

Abstract

Competition for positive attention in financial markets frequently resembles a tournament, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. We present a rational expectations model in which firms compete for such positive attention and show that higher competition for this prize makes discretionary disclosure less likely. In the limit when the market is perfectly competitive, transparency is minimized. We show that this effect persists when considering general prize structures, prizes that change in size as a result of competition, endogenous prizes, prizes granted on the basis of percentile, product market competition, and alternative game theoretic formulations. The analysis implies that competition is unreliable as a driver of market transparency and should not be viewed as a panacea that assures self-regulation in financial markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Ian Carlin & Shaun William Davies & Andrew Miles Iannaccone, 2010. "Competing for Attention in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16085
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Otrok & Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2012. "Capital Controls or Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," Working Papers 1209, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Wei, Shang-Jin & Tong, Hui, 2012. "Does Trade Globalization Induce or Inhibit Corporate Transparency? Unbundling the Growth Potential and Product Market Competiti," CEPR Discussion Papers 8836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Tong, Hui & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2014. "Does trade globalization induce or inhibit corporate transparency? Unbundling the growth potential and product market competition channels," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 358-370.
    4. Bruce I. Carlin & Shimon Kogan, 2010. "Trading Complex Assets," NBER Working Papers 16187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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