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Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings

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  • Dion Bongaerts
  • K.J. Martijn Cremers
  • William N. Goetzmann

Abstract

This paper explores the economic role credit rating agencies play in the corporate bond market. We consider three existing theories about multiple ratings: information production, rating shopping and regulatory certification. Using differences in rating composition, default prediction and credit spread changes, our evidence only supports regulatory certification. Marginal, additional credit ratings are more likely to occur because of, and seem to matter primarily for regulatory purposes, but do not seem to provide significant additional information related to credit quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Dion Bongaerts & K.J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2009. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," NBER Working Papers 15331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15331
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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