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Social Security and the Timing of Divorce

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  • Gopi Shah Goda
  • John B. Shoven
  • Sita Nataraj Slavov

Abstract

Social Security provides spousal benefits in retirement to secondary workers in married couples based on the primary worker's earnings record. In addition, Social Security pays spousal benefits to divorced secondary workers whose marriages lasted at least ten years. However, if a marriage failed in less than ten years, no spousal benefits are paid. The spousal benefit is particularly valuable to secondary workers in couples where there is a large disparity in earnings between the primary worker and the secondary worker. We examine whether these couples, who have more to gain from extending their marriage to ten years, are more likely to delay divorce to the tenth year relative to a control group. We find that vulnerable couples are slightly more likely to delay divorce from year nine to year ten; however, the effect is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. While the "cliff"-vesting of retirement benefits for divorced spouses raises equity concerns, it does not appear to distort incentives for divorce.

Suggested Citation

  • Gopi Shah Goda & John B. Shoven & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007. "Social Security and the Timing of Divorce," NBER Working Papers 13382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13382
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Feldstein, Martin & Samwick, Andrew A., 1992. "Social Security Rules and Marginal Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 45(1), pages 1-22, March.
    2. Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Cristian Meghea, 2004. "The Effect of Social Security on Divorce and Remarriage Behavior," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2004-9, Center for Retirement Research, revised Apr 2004.
    3. Gopi Shah Goda, 2007. "Implicit Social Security Tax Rates over the Life Cycle," Discussion Papers 06-021, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Melissa M. Favreault & C. Eugene Steuerle, 2007. "Social Security Spouse and Survivor Benefits for the Modern Family," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2007-07, Center for Retirement Research, revised Feb 2007.
    5. James Alm & Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, 1999. "Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 193-204, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Max Groneck & Johanna Wallenius, 2021. "It Sucks to Be Single! Marital Status and Redistribution of Social Security [Female labor supply as insurance against idiosyncratic risk]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(633), pages 327-371.
    2. Margherita Borella & Mariacristina De Nardi & Fang Yang, 2023. "Are Marriage-Related Taxes and Social Security Benefits Holding Back Female Labour Supply?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(1), pages 102-131.
    3. Margherita Borella & Mariacristina De Nardi & Fang Yang, 2017. "Marriage-related Policies in an Estimated Life-cycle Model of Households’ Labor Supply and Savings for Two Cohorts," Working Papers wp371, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    4. Margherita Borella & Mariacristina De Nardi & Fang Yang, 2017. "The Effects of Marriage-Related Taxes and Social Security Benefits," NBER Working Papers 23972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Stancanelli, Elena G. F., 2014. "Divorcing Upon Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study," IZA Discussion Papers 8117, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    7. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Institut des Politiques Publiques halshs-03156317, HAL.
    8. Rennane, Stephanie, 2020. "A double safety net? Understanding interactions between disability benefits, formal assistance, and family support," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    9. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Working Papers halshs-03156317, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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