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Social Security and Pensions

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  • Edward P. Lazear

Abstract

Recent and proposed changes in the social security statutes can have profound effects on worker behavior and on pensions themselves. In the context of an optimal lifetime compensation plan, pensions depend on efficient dates of retirement. To the extent that changes in social security affect the efficient date of retirement, both the pension and the wage profile itself will react. Four proposed changes in the social security system are analyzed.The cost savings associated with the change, as well as the effect on pensions and worker compensation in general are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Social Security and Pensions," NBER Working Papers 1322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-559, September.
    2. Alan S. Blinder, 1982. "Private Pensions and Public Pensions: Theory and Fact," NBER Working Papers 0902, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mitchell, Olivia S & Fields, Gary S, 1984. "The Economics of Retirement Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 84-105, January.
    4. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    5. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    6. Glenn M. MacDonald & Geoffrey Carliner, 1980. "A Theory of Optimal Retirement," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 8009, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    7. Roger H. Gordon & Alan S. Blinder, 1980. "Market Wages, Reservation Wages, and Retirement Decisions," NBER Chapters, in: Econometric Studies in Public Finance, pages 277-308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivia S. Mitchell & Rebecca A. Luzadis, 1985. "Firm-Level Policy Toward Older Workers," NBER Working Papers 1579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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