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A Wolfram in Sheep's Clothing: U.S. Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940-1944

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  • Leonard Caruana
  • Hugh Rockoff

Abstract

One of the most sustained uses of economic warfare by the United States occurred in Spain during WWII. We provide an overview of this episode based on the secondary literature and new research in the Spanish archives. We focus on three key battles: (1) an oil embargo against Spain in the summer of 1940, (2) pre-emptive buying of wolfram (tungsten ore) during the middle years of the war, and (3) a second oil embargo in the first months of 1944. The first oil embargo, although launched when Germany was going from victory to victory, was successful in helping keep Spain neutral because it forced the Franco regime to rethink the costs of joining the war. Pre-emptive buying of wolfram was also successful. It forced Germany to pay more for and to consume less tungsten, a material crucial for hardening steel. Ironically, the second oil embargo, undertaken when the Germans were retreating on all fronts, was less successful. The major goal, halting shipments of wolfram to Germany, was not fully realized. Several special circumstances, in particular the naval blockade and the tendency of sanctions and incentives to push the Franco regime in the direction consistent with its long-run survival, help explain the successes.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard Caruana & Hugh Rockoff, 2001. "A Wolfram in Sheep's Clothing: U.S. Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940-1944," NBER Historical Working Papers 0132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberhi:0132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
    2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, April.
    3. Carreras, Albert, 1984. "La produccion industrial española, 1842–1981: construccion de un indice anual," Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 127-157, March.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rosado Cubero, Ana, 2014. "Gilda: El coste de lanzar un guante a un oligopolista/Gilda: The Cost to Challenge a Cartel Member," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 32, pages 247-258, Enero.
    2. Marcelo Paiva Abreu, 2014. "A ‘blank cheque'? Portuguese Second World War sterling balances, 1940–73," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(2), pages 535-555, May.

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