IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/muc/wpaper/201041.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Comparing Cartel Behavior: A Simulation Analysis with the System of Cartel Markers (SCM)

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Hendrik Preißler-Jebe, Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Alexander Geist

Abstract

This work simulates the behavior of a price, quota and regional cartel in terms of indicators such as price, capacity and rate of return. As a first step the specific behavior patterns of each cartel are indicated in a graphical analysis before a comparison to a competitive benchmark has been implemented. In a second step simulation data has been applied to the System of Cartel Markers (SCM) invented by Blanckenburg and Geist. The SCM uses empirical correlation and stationarity of indicators to provide empirical evidence for cartel behavior. For the simulated cartel data the SCM delivered consistent results which underline its functionality for simulation purposes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Hendrik Preißler-Jebe, Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Alexander Geist, "undated". "Comparing Cartel Behavior: A Simulation Analysis with the System of Cartel Markers (SCM)," Working Papers 201041, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
    • Handle: RePEc:muc:wpaper:201041
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cawm/forschen/Download/Diskbeitraege/preissler_blanckenburg_geist_2010.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2011. "Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 15-33, August.
    2. Geroski, Paul A & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "The Persistence of Profits: A European Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 375-389, June.
    3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    4. Blanckenburg Korbinian von & Kholodilin Konstantin A. & Geist Alexander, 2012. "The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 245-256, August.
    5. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 911-922, July.
    6. Brown, A. Blake & Martin, Laura L., 1996. "Price Versus Quota Reductions: U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Policy," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 1-8, December.
    7. repec:diw:diwwpp:dp1030 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    9. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October.
    10. Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
    11. Blake Brown, A. & Martin, Laura L., 1996. "Price versus Quota Reductions: U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Policy," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 445-452, December.
    12. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2011. "Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 15-33, August.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    3. Bos, Iwan & Marini, Marco A., 2019. "Cartel stability under quality differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 70-73.
    4. Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020. "Collusive Market Allocations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14563, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 654-682, September.
    6. Andrei Y. Shastitko & Svetlana V. Golovanova, 2014. "Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 49/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini, 2022. "Collusion in quality‐segmented markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(2), pages 293-323, April.
    8. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
    9. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.
    11. Matthew Olczak, 2010. "Unilateral versus Coordinated Effects: Comparing the Impact on Consumer Welfare of Alternative Merger Outcomes," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    12. Hélder Vasconcelos, 2008. "Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 973-1010, December.
    13. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    14. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.
    15. Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2014. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    16. Hunold, Matthias & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Licht, Georg & Nikogosian, Vigen & Stenzel, André & Ullrich, Hannes & Wolf, Christoph, 2011. "Modernisierung der Konzentrationsberichterstattung: Endbericht," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 110525.
    17. Gerhard Clemenz & Klaus Gugler, 2009. "Locational choice and price competition: some empirical results for the austrian retail gasoline market," Studies in Empirical Economics, in: Giuseppe Arbia & Badi H. Baltagi (ed.), Spatial Econometrics, pages 223-244, Springer.
    18. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    19. Shon M. Ferguson, 2015. "Endogenous Product Differentiation, Market Size and Prices," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 45-61, February.
    20. Tanja Artiga González & Markus Schmid & David Yermack, 2019. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4813-4840, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:muc:wpaper:201041. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Norbert Hiller (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ismuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.