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Does the distribution of emission permits matter for international competitiveness?

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the implications of the distribution of emission permits related to a strategic environmental policy and shows how it alters the competitive relation among firms in the international product market. Our model introduces permits trading into the Brander-Spencer [1985] framework. It analyzes a class of two stages Cournot game involving two governments (Home and Foreign) and their respective industry. It shows the incentive for the Home government to distort is initial distribution of permits from the first-best rule to achieve trade-related policy objectives, enabling its domestic producers to improve their market shares. We establish that the Home government implements a higher distribution of permits than the optimal level

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  • Florent Pratlong, 2005. "Does the distribution of emission permits matter for international competitiveness?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v05011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:v05011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kling, Catherine L. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2000. "On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 235-238, November.
    2. Rob Van der Laan & Andries Nentjes, 2001. "Competitive Distortions in EU Environmental Legislation: Inefficiency versus Inequity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 131-152, March.
    3. Malueg, David A., 1990. "Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 66-77, January.
    4. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    5. Rauscher, Michael, 1994. "On Ecological Dumping," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 822-840, Supplemen.
    6. Conrad Klaus, 1993. "Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 121-135, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christos Constantatos & Eleftherios Filippiadis & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2014. "Using the allocation of emission permits for strategic trade purposes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 259-280, June.
    2. Julien Bueb & Sonia Schwartz, 2011. "Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 313-331, June.
    3. Bueb, Julien & Schwartz, Sonia, 2009. "Permis d’émission négociables et commerce international dans des marchés de concurrence imparfaite," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 85(3), pages 303-318, septembre.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tradable emission permits; international oligopoly; strategic policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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