The motivated memory of noise
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Castagnetti, Alessandro & Schmacker, Renke, 2022. "Protecting the ego: Motivated information selection and updating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
- Matthew S. Levendusky, 2013. "Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(3), pages 611-623, July.
- Michael Thaler, 2024.
"The Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 1-38, May.
- Michael Thaler, 2020. "The Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News," Papers 2012.01663, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
- John V. Kane & Jason Barabas, 2019. "No Harm in Checking: Using Factual Manipulation Checks to Assess Attentiveness in Experiments," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(1), pages 234-249, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Michael Thaler, 2024.
"The Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 1-38, May.
- Michael Thaler, 2020. "The Fake News Effect: Experimentally Identifying Motivated Reasoning Using Trust in News," Papers 2012.01663, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
- Jantsje M. Mol & Ivan Soraperra & Joël J. van der Weele, 2023. "Spoiling the party. Experimental evidence on the willingness to transmit inconvenient ethical information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-062/I, Tinbergen Institute, revised 29 Nov 2024.
- Emin Karagözoğlu & Elif Tosun, 2022. "Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-32, November.
- Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
- Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2019. "When do people exploit moral wiggle room? An experimental analysis in a market setup," Working Papers 2019-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Andreoni, James & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2021.
"Time inconsistent charitable giving,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
- James Andreoni & Marta Serra-Garcia, 2016. "Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving," NBER Working Papers 22824, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kingsley, David C., 2021. "Norm enforcement with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 403-430.
- Ayelet Gneezy & Alex Imas & Amber Brown & Leif D. Nelson & Michael I. Norton, 2012. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 179-187, January.
- Ingar Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2023.
"Designing Information Provision Experiments,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 3-40, March.
- Ingar K. Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2020. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 8406, CESifo.
- Ingar Haaland & Christopher Roth & Johannes Wohlfart, 2020. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," CEBI working paper series 20-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI).
- Haaland, Ingar & Roth, Christopher & Wohlfart, Johannes, 2020. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 484, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Haaland, Ingar & Roth, Christopher & Wohlfart. Johannes, 2020. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1275, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Billur Aksoy & Silvana Krasteva, 2020. "When does less information translate into more giving to public goods?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1148-1177, December.
- Shaul Shalvi & Ivan Soraperra & Joël van der Weele & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Shooting the Messenger? Supply and Demand in Markets for Willful Ignorance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-071/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Lucas C. Coffman & Alexander Gotthard-Real, 2019. "Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(8), pages 3904-3927, August.
- Yohanes E. Riyanto & Jianlin Zhang, 2016. "Putting a price tag on others’ perceptions of us," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 480-499, June.
- Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Orland, 2020. "Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?," CEPA Discussion Papers 17, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Kops, Christopher & Pasichnichenko, Illia, 2023. "Testing negative value of information and ambiguity aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Embrey, Matthew & Hyndman, Kyle & Riedl, Arno, 2021.
"Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 335-354.
- Embrey, M.S. & Hyndman, K. & Riedl, A.M., 2014. "Bargaining with a residual claimant: An experimental study," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Matthew Embrey & Kyle Hyndmanz & Arno Riedl, 2020. "Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series 1520, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
- Matthew Embrey & Kyle Hyndman & Arno Riedl, 2019. "Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series 0419, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
- Matthew Embrey & Kyle Hyndman & Arno Riedl, 2014. "Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 5087, CESifo.
- Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2019. "The role of communication in fair division with subjective claims," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 72-89.
- Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Liang, Pinghan & Meng, Juanjuan, 2016. "Favor transmission and social image concern: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 14-21.
- Taha Movahedi, 2020. "Group Uncertainty and Social Preferences," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2020-07, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
More about this item
Keywords
Controlled experiment; Motivated beliefs; Overconfidence; Noisy feedback;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2024-11-04 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2024-11-04 (Experimental Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Label (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.