IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/cesdoc/11015.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Economic freedom in Muslim countries: an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency

Author

Abstract

This article explains the level of economic freedom in Muslim countries through the theory of institutional path dependency. Islamic countries are generally not free and they have a poor record regarding property rights. To explain these realities we use the institutional history of Muslim countries. We define three steps: the Arab and Ottoman Empires when Islamic law was of great importance, European colonisation, and the contemporary era with its movement towards a revival of Islam. Islamic law is not liberal. This explains why, in general, Muslin countries are generally not free. Colonisation radically changed institutional life in the twentieth century. British colonisation proved to be better than did French or Soviet colonisation. This explains why the Persian Gulf countries are freer. The collapse of the Soviet model explains the speed of liberalisation in former socialist countries (such as Albania, Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan). Nevertheless, the twentieth century was not just the century of Westernisation. It was also the century of the revival of Islam. The article concludes that the history of the twentieth century does not explain the way in which Muslim countries are attracted by the ideal of the Muslim city. The revival of Islamic intellectual innovations and the evolution of Muslim opinion sustain this thesis. Therefore, there is a dependency on the past and on an imagined future. Islam acts, like yesterday, on the world of institutional possibilities

Suggested Citation

  • François Facchini, 2011. "Economic freedom in Muslim countries: an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2011/11015.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics," Chapters, in: Laura E. Grube & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), Culture and Economic Action, chapter 6, pages 123-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Spindler, Zane A, 1991. "Liberty and Development: A Further Empirical Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 197-210, February.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    4. Liebowitz, S J & Margolis, Stephen E, 1995. "Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 205-226, April.
    5. De Vanssay, Xavier & Spindler, Z A, 1994. "Freedom and Growth: Do Constitutions Matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 359-372, March.
    6. Francois Facchini, 2010. "Religion, law and development: Islam and Christianity—Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that man invented the institutions of freedom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 103-129, February.
    7. François Facchini, 2010. "Religion, law and development: Islam and Christianity--Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that man invented the institutions of freedom?," Post-Print hal-00432954, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. François Facchini, 2011. "Economic freedom in Muslim countries : an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00587694, HAL.
    2. François Facchini, 2013. "Economic freedom in Muslim countries: an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 139-167, August.
    3. François Facchini, 2011. "Economic freedom in Muslim countries : an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency," Post-Print halshs-00587694, HAL.
    4. François Facchini, 2013. "Economic freedom in Muslim countries: an explanation using the theory of institutional path dependency," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00636998, HAL.
    5. Kaya Abdullah & Tsai I-Tsung, 2016. "Inclusive Economic Institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Current Status and Theoretical Implications," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 139-173, August.
    6. Niklas Potrafke, 2016. "Policies against human trafficking: the role of religion and political institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 353-386, November.
    7. Erdogdu, Erkan, 2013. "A cross-country analysis of electricity market reforms: Potential contribution of New Institutional Economics," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 239-251.
    8. Wang, Lanfang & Wang, Susheng, 2012. "Economic freedom and cross-border venture capital performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 26-50.
    9. Hillman, Arye L. & Metsuyanim, Kfir & Potrafke, Niklas, 2015. "Democracy with group identity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 274-287.
    10. Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2013. "Does religiosity promote property rights and the rule of law?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 161-185, June.
    11. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Islam and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 185-192, April.
    12. Gouda, Moamen & Potrafke, Niklas, 2016. "Gender equality in Muslim-majority countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 683-698.
    13. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, August.
    14. Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Democracy and countries with Muslim majorities: a reply and update," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 323-332, March.
    15. Mike, Károly, 2016. "Merre vezessen a magyar kapitalizmus útja?. Látkép Ronald Coase világítótornyából [Which course for Hungary s capitalism?. A view from Ronald Coase s lighthouse]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 597-614.
    16. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2016. "The past, present and future of comparative law and economics," Chapters, in: Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello (ed.), Comparative Law and Economics, chapter 1, pages 3-22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Nguyen Tan Hung & Tran Thi Kim Oanh & Chu Thi Thanh Trang, 2024. "The impact of economic freedom on economic growth in countries with high and low regulatory quality—lessons for Viet Nam," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, December.
    18. Mukherjee Deepraj & Dutta Nabamita, 2013. "Do Political Institutions and Culture Jointly Matter for Financial Development? A Cross-Country Panel Investigation," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 203-232, June.
    19. Polimeni, John M. & Iorgulescu Polimeni, Raluca & Trees, W. Scott, 2007. "Extending The Augmented Solow Growth Model To Explain Transitional Economies," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 4(1), pages 65-76, March.
    20. Ruzica Simic Banovic, 2015. "(Former) Informal Networks As A Reflection Of Informal Institutions In East European Transitional Societies: Legacy Or Opportunism?," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 10(1), pages 179-205, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic freedom; colonisation; imaginary; Islam; property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Label (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.