Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Affiliation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019. "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 99-130.
- Chen, Bo & Jiang, Xiandeng & Knyazev, Dmitriy, 2017. "On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 66-73.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
- Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
- Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023. "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 141-160.
- Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
- Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2022.
"Two-stage contests with preferences over style,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1141-1161, November.
- David Wettstein & Todd R. Kaplan, 2016. "Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style," Working Papers 1607, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2016. "Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style," MPRA Paper 73539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
- Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
- Chen, Bo, 2019. "On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 60-65.
- Bo Chen & Emilios Galariotis & Lijun Ma & Zijia Wang & Zhaobo Zhu, 2023. "On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result," Post-Print hal-04185528, HAL.
- Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023.
"Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
23-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," NBER Working Papers 31036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Feng, Xin, 2024. "Ambiguous persuasion in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 182-201.
- Xin Feng, 2023. "Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 401-421, June.
- Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020. "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Bo Chen & Emilios Galariotis & Lijun Ma & Zijia Wang & Zhaobo Zhu, 2023. "On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 328(2), pages 1615-1629, September.
More about this item
Keywords
All-pay auction; Affiliation; Stochastic participation; Disclosure policies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-09-02 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2024-09-02 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2023-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Hans Mueller (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mptaxde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.