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Optimal Taxation when People Do Not Maximize Well-Being

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  • Aart Gerritsen

Abstract

I derive the optimal nonlinear income tax when individuals do not necessarily maximize their own well-being. This generates a corrective argument for taxation: optimal marginal taxes are higher (lower) if individuals work too much (too little) from a well-being point of view. I allow for multidimensional heterogeneity and derive the optimal tax schedule in terms of measurable sufficient statistics. One of these statistics measures the degree to which individuals fail to optimize their labor supply. I empirically estimate this by using British life satisfaction data as a measure of well-being. I ï¬ nd that low-income workers tend to work ‘too little’ and high-income workers ‘too much,’ providing a motive for lower marginal tax rates at the bottom and higher marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution.

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  • Aart Gerritsen, 2015. "Optimal Taxation when People Do Not Maximize Well-Being," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2015-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ravi Kanbur & Tuuli Paukkeri & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2018. "Optimal taxation and public provision for poverty reduction," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(1), pages 64-98, February.
    2. John A List & Ian Muirex & Devin Pope & Gregory Sun, 2023. "Left-Digit Bias at Lyft," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(6), pages 3186-3237.
    3. Aart Gerritsen, 2016. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: The Dual Approach," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2016-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; corrective taxation; subjective well-being;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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