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Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl

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  • Christoph Engel

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

Die Worte Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl kommen im Grundgesetz nicht vor. In ständiger Rechtsprechung betont das Bundesverfassungsgericht, dass das Grundgesetz keine Entscheidung über die deutsche Wirtschaftsverfassung getroffen hat. Gleichwohl hat das Gericht häufig über das Verhältnis von Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl entschieden. Es hat den Wettbewerb, also das freie Spiel der Kräfte, vor allem als eine Gefahr für das Gemeinwohl gedeutet. Vor allem sind die einschlägigen Entscheidungen aber sehr kursorisch. Dieser Beitrag systematisiert die Entscheidungspraxis und stellt ihr Kerngedanken der Wettbewerbstheorie entgegen. Für den wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb finden sich diese Gedanken in der ökonomischen Theorie, für den Stimmenwettbewerb in der politischen Theorie, für den Meinungswettbewerb in der publizistischen Theorie, für den Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen in Albert O. Hirschmans Theorie von Widerspruch und Abwanderung.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Gemeinwohl," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2021_08, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2021_08
    as

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    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2021_08online.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wettbewerb; Gemeinwohl; Bundesverfassungsgericht; wirtschaftlicher Wettbewerb; Stimmenwettbewerb; Meinungswettbewerb; Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F00 - International Economics - - General - - - General

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