Strategic Inattention in Product Search
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More about this item
Keywords
strategic inattention; price discrimination; information transmission; consumer choice; experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2017-10-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2017-10-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2017-10-15 (Marketing)
- NEP-PAY-2017-10-15 (Payment Systems and Financial Technology)
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