Limit pricing and secret barriers to entry
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Entry deterrence; limit pricing; signaling; pooling equilibrium;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-01-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2015-01-19 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-IND-2015-01-19 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2015-01-19 (Microeconomics)
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