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Kosten aus einer asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung zwischen Abschlussprüfer und Mandant

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  • Zein, Nicole
  • Simons, Dirk

Abstract

Die Einschätzungen des Abschlussprüfers über die Eigenschaften eines Mandanten fließen in die Annahme eines Prüfungsauftrages sowie die Festsetzung der Prüfungsgebühr ein. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert, wie die Informationsasymmetrie über das beim Mandanten vorliegende Risiko in der Gebührensetzung bei Erst- und Folgeprüfungen berücksichtigt werden kann. Für den Mandanten werden dabei zwei Risikotypen unterschieden, so dass die Informationsunsicherheit sich darauf bezieht, ob ein hohes oder ein geringes Prüfungs- oder Auftragsrisiko vorliegt. Ein Vergleich der Gebührensetzung bei symmetrischer und asymmetrischer Information zeigt, wann der Abschlussprüfer oder der Mandant die Kosten der vorvertraglichen Informationsasymmetrie trägt. Im Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, dass es bei asymmetrischer Information allein von den mandantenspezifischen Prüfungskosten abhängig ist, ob der riskante oder nicht riskante Mandant die Kosten trägt. Die Zusammensetzung des Mandantenportfolios beim Abschlussprüfer nimmt hingegen keinen Einfluss auf die Kosten, die der Informationsasymmetrie zurechenbar sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Zein, Nicole & Simons, Dirk, 2008. "Kosten aus einer asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung zwischen Abschlussprüfer und Mandant," Papers 08-34, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2338
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    File URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2338/1/dp08_34.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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