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Searching on a Deadline

Author

Listed:
  • S. Nuray Akin

    (Department of Economics, University of Miami)

  • Brennan C. Platt

    (Department of Economics, Brigham Young University)

Abstract

We analyze an equilibrium search model where the buyer seeks to purchase a good before a deadline. The buyer's reservation price rises continuously as the deadline approaches. A seller cannot observe a potential buyer's remaining time until deadline, and hence posts a price that weighs the probability of sale versus the profit once sold. The model has a unique equilibrium, which can take exactly one of two forms. In a late equilibrium, buyers initially forgo any purchases, only accepting some offers as the deadline draws near. In an early equilibrium, buyers are willing to accept some offers even as they enter the market. Equilibrium price dynamics are determined by the concentration of buyers near their deadline, as well as their urgency of completing the transaction before their deadline.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Nuray Akin & Brennan C. Platt, 2011. "Searching on a Deadline," Working Papers 2011-11, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mia:wpaper:2011-11
    as

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    File URL: https://www.herbert.miami.edu/_assets/files/repec/wp2011-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gerard J. van den Berg, 1990. "Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 255-277.
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    5. Rafael Rob, 1985. "Equilibrium Price Distributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 487-504.
    6. S. Nuray Akin & Brennan Platt, 2012. "Running Out of Time: Limited Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(2), pages 149-170, April.
    7. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
    8. Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-1339, November.
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    10. Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, 1979. "Equilibrium Comparison Shopping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(3), pages 543-553.
    11. James Albrecht & Axel Anderson & Eric Smith & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Opportunistic Matching In The Housing Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 641-664, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ş. Akın & Brennan Platt, 2014. "A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 101-133, January.
    2. Brennan Platt & Nuray Akin, 2012. "A theory of search with recall and uncertain deadlines," 2012 Meeting Papers 777, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multiple treatments; Equilibrium search; deadline; reservation prices; price posting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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