IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/man/sespap/1415.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Health behaviours and the patient-doctor interaction: The double moral hazard problem

Author

Listed:
  • Eleonora Fichera
  • James Banks
  • Matt Sutton

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Eleonora Fichera & James Banks & Matt Sutton, 2014. "Health behaviours and the patient-doctor interaction: The double moral hazard problem," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1415, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:1415
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-1415.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fichera, Eleonora & Sutton, Matt, 2011. "State and self investments in health," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1164-1173.
    2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    3. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
    4. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
    5. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-367, June.
    6. Robert G. Evans, 1974. "Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications," International Economic Association Series, in: Mark Perlman (ed.), The Economics of Health and Medical Care, chapter 10, pages 162-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2008. "The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 279-300, December.
    8. Philip H. Dybvig & Nancy A. Lutz, 1993. "Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 575-597.
    9. Canice Prendergast, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(2), pages 523-534.
    10. Demakakos, Panayotes & Nazroo, James & Breeze, Elizabeth & Marmot, Michael, 2008. "Socioeconomic status and health: The role of subjective social status," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 330-340, July.
    11. Hugh Gravelle & Matt Sutton & Ada Ma, 2010. "Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(542), pages 129-156, February.
    12. Parsons, Donald O., 2011. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 6003, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Reid, Joseph D, Jr, 1977. "The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited-Again," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 403-407, April.
    14. Pradeep Agrawal, 2002. "Double Moral Hazard, Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 33-61, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fichera, Eleonora & Emsley, Richard & Sutton, Matt, 2016. "Is treatment “intensity” associated with healthier lifestyle choices? An application of the dose response function," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 149-163.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein, 2010. "Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 676-686, August.
    2. Parsons, Donald O., 2011. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 6003, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Fichera, Eleonora & Banks, James & Siciliani, Luigi & Sutton, Matt, 2018. "Does patient health behaviour respond to doctor effort?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 225-251.
    4. Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008. "Delegation and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682, September.
    5. Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 1999. "Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 275-294, November.
    6. Fichera, Eleonora & Gray, Ewan & Sutton, Matt, 2016. "How do individuals’ health behaviours respond to an increase in the supply of health care? Evidence from a natural experiment," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 170-179.
    7. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    8. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2017. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 117-141, October.
    9. Coustaury, Camille & Jeannot, Elias & Moreau, Adele & Nietge, Clotilde & Maharani, Asri & Richards, Lindsay & Präg, Patrick, 2023. "Subjective socioeconomic status and self-rated health in the English Longitudinal Study of Aging: A fixed-effects analysis☆☆We thank the anonymous reviewers of Social Science & Medicine for their help," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 336(C).
    10. Junhong Chu & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2009. "Quantifying the Economic Value of Warranties in the U.S. Server Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 99-121, 01-02.
    11. M. A. Taslim, 1992. "A Survey of Theories of Cropshare Tenancy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 68(3), pages 254-275, September.
    12. Sun-Moon Jung & Jae Yong Shin, 2022. "Social Performance Incentives in Mission-Driven Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7631-7657, October.
    13. Beck, Ulrik & Bjerge, Benedikte, 2017. "Pro-poor Land Transfers and the Importance of Land Abundance and Ethnicity in The Gambia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 122-140.
    14. Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen, 2008. "What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm Innovation," NBER Working Papers 14443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Alena Podaneva & Pierre Picard, 2023. "Facility Management Services in UK Hospitals: in-house or outsourcing," DEM Discussion Paper Series 23-15, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    17. Chen, Xu & Li, Ling & Zhou, Ming, 2012. "Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 807-816.
    18. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.
    19. Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2003. "Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 287-318.
    20. Albert Y. Ha & Shilu Tong, 2008. "Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(5), pages 419-431, August.
    21. Jianhua Ma & Xingzheng Ai & Wen Yang & Yanchun Pan, 2019. "Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers’ extended warranties," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 275(2), pages 485-510, April.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:sespap:1415. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patrick Macnamara (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/semanuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.