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Addressing the Food Aid Curse

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Listed:
  • Max Blouin
  • Stéphane Pallage

Abstract

In this paper, we build a model of agrarian economies in which a kleptocratic government taxes farmers to maximize its life-time utility. The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the subsistence of farmers requires a minimum level of consumption. We analyze the effect that a benevolent food aid agency can have in such an environment. If it expects the food aid agency to intervene, the kleptocratic government will starve its farmers, in a clear case of the Samaritan's dilemma. We show that the likelihood of man-made famines, however, can be greatly reduced if the food aid agency intervenes with probability slightly lower than one. No aid agency devoted to saving lives, however, can commit to such policy. We propose a solution to this food aid curse.

Suggested Citation

  • Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2007. "Addressing the Food Aid Curse," Cahiers de recherche 0717, CIRPEE.
    • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0717
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    2. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 162-192, 04/05.
    4. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
    5. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2006. "Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 249-263, February.
    6. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
    7. Karl Pedersen, 2001. "The Samaritan's Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 693-703, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alok Kumar, 2014. "Samaritan's Dilemma, Time-Inconsistency and Foreign Aid: A Review of Theoretical Models," Department Discussion Papers 1405, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    2. Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016. "Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
    3. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2008. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 548-565, August.
    4. Amy Margolies & John Hoddinott, 2012. "Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future Directions," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-034, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Alok Kumar, 2017. "Foreign Aid, Incentives and Efficiency: Can Foreign Aid Lead to the Efficient Level of Investment?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 678-697, August.
    6. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo.
    7. Hoddinott, John & Margolies, Amy, 2012. "Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future Directions," WIDER Working Paper Series 034, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. repec:unu:wpaper:wp2012-34 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Food aid; famines; commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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