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Revisiting Friendship Networks

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  • Sudipta Sarangi
  • Aditi Roy

Abstract

We extend the model of friendship networks developed by Brueck- ner (2006) in two ways. First, we extend the level of indirect benefits by incorporating benefits from up to three links and explore its impli- cation for the socially optimal and individual e�ort levels. Next, we generalize the magnetic agent problem by allowing for more than 3 players by restricting ourselves to regular networks that include pay- o�s from the magnetic agent.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudipta Sarangi & Aditi Roy, 2009. "Revisiting Friendship Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2009-12, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2009-12
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    File URL: https://www.lsu.edu/business/economics/files/workingpapers/pap09_12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.
    4. Jan K. Brueckner, 2006. "Friendship Networks," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 847-865, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2023. "A model of the formation of multilayer networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    2. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
    3. Quqiong He & Sudipta Sarangi & Zhengjia Sun, 2019. "A Note On Asymmetries In Friendship Networks," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 64(03), pages 799-811, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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