IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/liv/livedp/200403.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

So, Do You Really Want to Be a Senator? The Political Economy of Candidate Motivation and Electoral Defeat in Chile

Author

Listed:
  • David Hojman

    (Management School, University of Liverpool, UK)

Abstract

If, as a candidate, I really want to win a seat, I will prefer to run in a favourable district, and with a list partner who maximises my own chances of success (in a 2-seat district). In the 1997 and 2001 Chilean Senate elections, many government candidates chose precisely the opposite. This ‘perverse’ behaviour was especially noticeable in 2001, when ‘consolation prizes’ for losers (the spoils of Presidential office) were twice as large as in 1997. The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that these candidates did not really want to win seats, but to qualify for ‘consolation prizes’.

Suggested Citation

  • David Hojman, 2004. "So, Do You Really Want to Be a Senator? The Political Economy of Candidate Motivation and Electoral Defeat in Chile," Working Papers 200403, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:liv:livedp:200403
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.liv.ac.uk/managementschool/research/working%20papers/wp200403.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dow, Jay K, 1998. "A Spatial Analysis of Candidate Competition in Dual Member Districts: The 1989 Chilean Senatorial Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 451-474, December.
    2. Hojman, David E, 2002. "The Political Economy of Chile's Fast Economic Growth: An Olsonian Interpretation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 155-178, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sorokin, Constantine & Zakharov, Alexei, 2018. "Vote-motivated candidates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 232-254.
    2. Alexei Zakharov, 2012. "Probabilistic voting equilibria under nonlinear candidate payoffs," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 235-247, April.
    3. Alexei Zakharov & Constantine Sorokin, 2014. "Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 429-446, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pablo Henr'iquez & Jorge Sabat & Jos'e Patr`icio Sullivan, 2021. "Politicians' Willingness to Agree: Evidence from the interactions in Twitter of Chilean Deputies," Papers 2106.09163, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    2. Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.
    3. Arroyo Francisco & Edmunds John C., 2010. "The Macro Dimensions of Chile's Export Dilemma," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 9(4), pages 1-19, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:liv:livedp:200403. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rachel Slater (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mslivuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.