Wealth Distribution and Individual Voting Preferences: A Comparative Perspective

Theories of economic voting have provided essential insights into determinants of voting behavior. With increasing levels of economic inequality and polarization among voters and elites, economic voting may be of even greater salience today. Historically, economic voting has been measured by income or class but never by wealth. Wealth inequality, however, is typically twice as large as income inequality. This paper extends the political science literature to examine the role of wealth in voting behavior by examining three countries, each considered ideal types for particular political and social regimes. Greater levels of both wealth and income are associated with a greater likelihood of voting for a conservative party in the United States, a liberal welfare regime. Income and employment matter more in Germany, a corporatist regime. Despite increasing wealth and income inequality, there is little support for economic voting in Sweden, the classic social-democratic regime. The findings of this paper indicate that economic voting is mediated by political and economic context. Individual-level data are drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) Database. Statistical matching methods are utilized to integrate electoral and wealth surveys, and probit regression models are used to analyze relationships quantitatively.