IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/levppb/ppb_83.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reforming Deposit Insurance: The Case to Replace FDIC Protection with Self-Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Panos Konstas

Abstract

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) currently insures bank deposit balances up to $100,000. According to some observers, statutory protection creates moral hazard problems for insurers because it allows banks to engage in risky activities. As an example, moral hazard was a key contributor to huge losses suffered when thrift institutions failed during the 1980s. This brief by Konstas outlines a plan to reduce the risk of government losses by replacing insured deposits with uninsured deposits and eliminating some of the costs of deposit insurance. His plan proposes a self-insured (SI) depositor system that places an intermediary between the lender (saver) and borrower (bank) in the credit-flow chain. The FDIC would guarantee saver loans and allow the intermediary to borrow at the risk-free interest rate if the intermediaryÕs bank deposit is statutorily defined outside the realm of FDIC insurance. The risk is therefore transferred to depositors (intermediaries); thus creating incentives for depositors to earn a rate of return at least equal to the cost of borrowing plus a risk premium based on the risk profile of banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Panos Konstas, 2006. "Reforming Deposit Insurance: The Case to Replace FDIC Protection with Self-Insurance," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_83, Levy Economics Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb_83
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_83.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1997. "FDICIA after Five Years," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 139-158, Summer.
    2. Catharine Lemieux, 1993. "FDICIA : where did it come from and where will it take us?," Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Nov, pages 1-13.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Panos Konstas, 2005. "FDIC-Sponsored Self-Insured Depositors: Using Insurance to Gain Market Discipline and Lower the Cost of Bank Funding," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_419, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2004_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ponce, Jorge, 2010. "Lender of last resort policy: What reforms are necessary?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 188-206, April.
    4. J.-P. Niinimäki, 2012. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    5. Huberto M. Ennis & H. S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 91(Spr), pages 21-44.
    6. George G. Kaufman, 1998. "Central banks, asset bubbles, and financial stability," Working Paper Series WP-98-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    7. Cargill, Thomas F. & Parker, Elliott, 2004. "Price deflation and consumption: central bank policy and Japan's economic and financial stagnation," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 493-506, June.
    8. Jin, Justin Yiqiang & Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Lobo, Gerald J., 2013. "Unintended consequences of the increased asset threshold for FDICIA internal controls: Evidence from U.S. private banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 4879-4892.
    9. Kirstein, Roland, 2002. "The new Basle Accord, internal ratings, and the incentives of banks," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 393-412, May.
    10. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
    11. Dimitrios Bisias & Mark Flood & Andrew W. Lo & Stavros Valavanis, 2012. "A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 255-296, October.
    12. Viral V. Acharya & Hanh T. Le & Hyun Song Shin, 2017. "Bank Capital and Dividend Externalities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(3), pages 988-1018.
    13. Abel Elizalde, 2007. "From Basel I to Basel II: An Analysis of the Three Pillars," Working Papers wp2007_0704, CEMFI.
    14. Geoffrey Poitras & Giovanna Zanotti, 2018. "Housing Market Bubbles and Mortgage Contract Design: Implications for Mortgage Lenders and Households," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-18, July.
    15. Gilbert, R. Alton & Vaughan, Mark D., 2001. "Do depositors care about enforcement actions?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 283-311.
    16. Kasztelnik Karina, 2020. "Innovative Empirical Model for Predicting National Banks’ Financial Failure with Artificial Intelligence Subset Data Analysis in the United States," Open Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 98-111, January.
    17. Bigus, Jochen & Prigge, Stefan, 2005. "When risk premiums decrease as the bank's risk increases--a caveat on the use of subordinated bonds as an instrument of banking supervision," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 369-390, October.
    18. George Benston, 2000. "Consumer Protection as Justification for Regulating Financial-Services Firms and Products," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 277-301, September.
    19. ap Gwilym, Rhys & Kanas, Angelos & Molyneux, Philip, 2013. "U.S. prompt corrective action and bank risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 239-257.
    20. Richard J. Cebula, 2011. "Impact of Banking Statutes, Housing-Market, Economic, and Financial Conditions on Bank Failures in the U.S, 1970-2008: GARCH Estimates," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 2(1), pages 23-30, March.
    21. Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: the Role of Reputation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0676, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb_83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Elizabeth Dunn (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.levyinstitute.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.