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The ECB and the Single European Financial Market: A Proposal to Repair Half of a Flawed Design

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  • Mario Tonveronachi

Abstract

The flaws of the Maastrict Treaty are a frequent object of commentary but, as yet, Europe remains unable—or, perhaps more accurately, unwilling—to address these flaws. The European project will remain unfinished and the ability of the European Central Bank to implement effective monetary policies will continue to be hobbled. As Mario Tonveronachi observes in this public policy brief, Europe has a currency union, but this does not mean that Europe has achieved a single financial market, an essential element for a functioning union. He reminds us that a single European market requires pricing in relation to common risk-free assets rather than in relation to a collection of individual idiosyncratic sovereign rates. And financial operators must have access to the same risk-free assets for trading and liquidity operations. The euro provides neither of these functions, and thus, while there has been a measure of convergence, a single financial market, and the financial integration it represents, remains unachieved.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tonveronachi, 2014. "The ECB and the Single European Financial Market: A Proposal to Repair Half of a Flawed Design," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_137, Levy Economics Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb_137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Buiter, Willem, 2008. "Can Central Banks Go Broke?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Jan A. Kregel, 2000. "Can European Banks Survive a Unified Currency in a Nationally Segmented Capital Market?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_305, Levy Economics Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arne Hansen & Dirk Meyer, 2021. "EZB-Schuldverschreibungen — neue Verwendung für ein altes Instrument? [ECB Debt Certificates — New Use for an Old Instrument?]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(9), pages 732-739, September.
    2. Mario Tonveronachi, 2015. "The ECB, the Single Financial Market, and a Revision of the Euro Area Fiscal Rules," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_140, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Jorg Bibow, 2015. "The Euro's Savior? Assessing the ECB's Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_845, Levy Economics Institute.
    4. van Riet, Ad, 2017. "Addressing the safety trilemma: a safe sovereign asset for the eurozone," ESRB Working Paper Series 35, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Schiliro, Daniele, 2017. "Governance and institutions for stability and growth in the Eurozone," MPRA Paper 95428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Mario Tonveronachi, 2018. "European Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities: An Assessment and an Alternative Proposal," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_145, Levy Economics Institute.

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