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Rooms for extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme

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Listed:
  • Christophe Blot

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Jérôme Creel

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Paul Hubert

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

The announcement of an extension of quantitative easing (QE) until March 2017, at least, has cast doubts on the strength of the Euro area recovery and it has raised concerns about the credibility of the ECB. In this contribution, we argue that the current design of QE prevents unlimited monetary accommodation and, meanwhile, it may reduce the effectiveness of QE. Extending QE again through a modification in its design is thus possible. It will be effective provided governments and the ECB are able to cooperate.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert, 2016. "Rooms for extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03459414, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03459414
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03459414
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    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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