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Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick BOLTON
  • Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN

Abstract

The paper develops a simple model of optimal corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analysed.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 9619, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9619
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Foucault & Christine A. Parlour, 2004. "Competition for Listings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 329-355, Summer.
    2. Zsuzsanna Fluck, 1999. "Capital Structure Decisions in Small and Large Firms: A Life-cycle Theory of Financing," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-069, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
    3. M. A. Martinez & M. Tapia & J. Yzaguirre, 2005. "Information transmission around block trades on the Spanish stock exchange," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 173-186.
    4. Guinnane, Timothy & Harris, Ron & Lamoreaux, Naomi R. & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 2007. "Putting the Corporation in its Place," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 687-729, September.
    5. Enrique Yacuzzi, 2005. "A primer on governance and performance in small and medium-sized enterprises," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 293, Universidad del CEMA.
    6. Sabri Boubaker & Hind Sami, 2011. "Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(3), pages 246-266, August.
    7. Yohane Khamfula, 2005. "African capital markets and real sector investment," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(4), pages 511-525.
    8. John S. Earle & Csaba Kucsera & Álmos Telegdy, 2005. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 254-264, March.
    9. Patrick Bolton & José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2006. "Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 577-610.
    10. Franz R. Hahn, 2002. "The Politics of Financial Development. The Case of Austria," WIFO Working Papers 187, WIFO.
    11. Armando Gomes, "undated". "Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    12. Jirapun Chorruk & Andrew Worthington, 2010. "Firm-specific determinants and outcomes of initial public offerings in Thailand, 2001â 2007," Discussion Papers in Finance finance:201002, Griffith University, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ownership structure; corporate control; liquidity; ownership concentration; block pricing; free rider problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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