Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries
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- George Deltas & Mattias K. Polborn, 2019. "Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 115-151, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting; primary elections; simultaneous versus sequential elections;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2018-08-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2018-08-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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