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Board expertise, networked boards and environmental performance

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  • Swarnodeep Homroy
  • Aurelie Cecile Dominique Slechten

Abstract

We analyze the role of board expertise in environmental issues (measured by the presence of non-executive directors with previous experience in environmental issues, EEDs) and director networks on GHG emissions. Using emission data of FTSE 350 firms, we show that the presence of EEDs on the board reduces GHG emissions. Also boards with better networked directors have better environmental performance. These associations are robust to alternative explanations - endogenous matching of firms and directors, general technical expertise of the board, and pro-active stacking in board composition. The results are consistent with the view that director skills and information spillovers through director networks add value.

Suggested Citation

  • Swarnodeep Homroy & Aurelie Cecile Dominique Slechten, 2016. "Board expertise, networked boards and environmental performance," Working Papers 140306795, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:140306795
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Director Expertise; Director Networks; Emissions; Environmental Performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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