IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lam/wpaper/14-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do malevolent leaders provoke conflict? An experiment on the paradox of the plenty

Author

Listed:
  • Klarizze Puzon
  • Marc Willinger

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group fighting, i.e. the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the role of leader behavior in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and leadership. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when resource size is higher. It is only when leaders are benevolent, i.e. they chose the strongest resource protection in the first stage, that group conflict (in come) is reduced (goes up). When leaders are malevolent, i.e. they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than those under anarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Klarizze Puzon & Marc Willinger, 2014. "Do malevolent leaders provoke conflict? An experiment on the paradox of the plenty," Working Papers 14-10, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2014-10.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2014
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Global Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 851-874, September.
    2. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Erik O Kimbrough & Roman M Sheremeta, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," Working Papers 14-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Poelhekke, Steven, 2010. "The pungent smell of "red herrings": Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 44-55, July.
    5. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Klarizze Anne Puzon & Marc Willinger, 2014. "WHY MY PARTICIPATION MATTERS: Rent-seeking with endogenous prize determination," Working Papers 14-05, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2014.
    7. Hodler, Roland, 2006. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
    8. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L, 1998. "Do the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Poorer? Experimental Tests of a Model of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 970-983, September.
    9. Rick Van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, 2010. "The Pungent Smell of “Red Herrings’: Subsoil assets, rents, volatility and the resource curse," OxCarre Working Papers 033, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    10. Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Visser, Martine, 2008. "Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 508-511, June.
    11. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
    12. Duffy, John & Kim, Minseong, 2005. "Anarchy in the laboratory (and the role of the state)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 297-329, March.
    13. Erik O Kimbrough & Roman M Sheremeta, 2014. "Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 51(4), pages 487-500, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Klarizze Anne Puzon & Marc Willinger, 2015. "Malevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-11, December.
    2. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
    3. Chi-Swian Wong, 2021. "Science Mapping: A Scientometric Review on Resource Curses, Dutch Diseases, and Conflict Resources during 1993–2020," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-48, July.
    4. Smith, Brock, 2015. "The resource curse exorcised: Evidence from a panel of countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 57-73.
    5. Klarizze Anne Martin Puzon, 2013. "Cost-Reducing R&D in the Presence of an Appropriation Alternative: An Application to the Natural Resource Curse," Working Papers 2013.30, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Apergis, Nicholas & Payne, James E., 2014. "The oil curse, institutional quality, and growth in MENA countries: Evidence from time-varying cointegration," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-9.
    7. Ulrike Kornek & Jan Christoph Steckel & Kai Lessmann & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2017. "The climate rent curse: new challenges for burden sharing," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 855-882, December.
    8. Antonakakis, Nikolaos & Cunado, Juncal & Filis, George & Gracia, Fernando Perez de, 2017. "Oil dependence, quality of political institutions and economic growth: A panel VAR approach," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 147-163.
    9. Dauvin, Magali & Guerreiro, David, 2017. "The Paradox of Plenty: A Meta-Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 212-231.
    10. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2016. "The institutional basis of efficiency in resource-rich countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 519-538.
    11. Lashitew, Addisu A. & Werker, Eric, 2020. "Do natural resources help or hinder development? Resource abundance, dependence, and the role of institutions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    12. Kaznacheev, Peter, 2013. "Resource Rents and Economic Growth: Economic and institutional development in countries with a high share of income from the sale of natural resources. Analysis and recommendations based on internatio," EconStor Research Reports 121950, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    13. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2023. "Does natural resource abundance breed corruption? The role of political institutions," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(9), pages 1-43, September.
    14. Antonakakis, Nikolaos & Cunado, Juncal & Filis, George & Perez de Gracia, Fernando, 2015. "The Resource Curse Hypothesis Revisited: Evidence from a Panel VAR," MPRA Paper 72085, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Dong-Hyeon Kim & Shu-Chin Lin, 2017. "Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(2), pages 363-391, February.
    16. Moradbeigi, Maryam & Law, Siong Hook, 2017. "The role of financial development in the oil-growth nexus," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 164-172.
    17. Badeeb, Ramez Abubakr & Lean, Hooi Hooi & Clark, Jeremy, 2017. "The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 123-134.
    18. Hailu, Degol & Kipgen, Chinpihoi, 2017. "The Extractives Dependence Index (EDI)," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 251-264.
    19. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2017. "Decisiveness, peace, and inequality in games of conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 216-229.
    20. Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2013. "The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 19-41.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:14-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patricia Modat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lamplfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.