IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/0329.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Bezalel Peleg

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Lars Peter Østerdal

    (Institute of Public Health, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonsrtates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Leth Hougaard & Bezalel Peleg & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2003. "The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties," Discussion Papers 03-29, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0329
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2003/0329.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Dogan, Emre, 2024. "Population monotonicity and egalitarianism," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
    3. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2021. "Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    convex games; core solutions; generalized Lorenz-maxima; coalitional monotonicity; population monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/okokudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.