Contract Duration and Socially Responsible Investment

This study was conducted using quantitative empirical analysis to clarify effects of changes in pay levels and personnel management that are brought about by the introduction of performance-based human resource management (HRM) on behavioral changes in public officials and on the occurrence of deviant behavior on the job. In 2016, the Japanese central government revised the law on personnel management for local government employees, introducing performance-based HRM in local governments. As described herein, using large-scale panel data of municipalities during 2010–2019, we particularly examine the effect of this change and present results of quantitative analysis with high analytical accuracy and reliability. The empirical analysis revealed that introduction of performance-based HRM has deterrent effects on deviant behavior taken by public officials on the job. Nevertheless, results clarified that performance-based HRM effectiveness is synergistically diminished when financial backing for pay levels in organizations is low on average. The findings suggest three points: (1) Public officials are extrinsically motivated because it responds to changes in compensation systems presented by organizations. (2) Hence, job motivation for public officials is not unconditionally established by intrinsic motivation. (3) fair employment relationships with the organization to which workers belong are important, especially with respect to compensation systems.