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The Chocie of Optimal Protection and Oligopoly: Import Tariffs vs Production Subsidies

Author

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  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the choice of import tariffs and production subsidies to provide optimal protection of domestic industry in the presence of oligopolistic competition, provided that there is a difference in costs between domestic and foreign firms. We show that the choice of optimal protection depends both on the difference in firms' costs and the relative number of firms across countries. First, in the case that the number of foreign firms is larger, an optimal protection is a production subsidy, regardless of the difference in costs. Second, in the case that the number of foreign firms is equal to, or less than that of domestic firms, an import tariff provides optimal protection if the difference in costs is large, while a production subsidy provides optimal protection if the differece in costs is small.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 1997. "The Chocie of Optimal Protection and Oligopoly: Import Tariffs vs Production Subsidies," Discussion Paper Series 19, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 1997.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:19
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Ramaswami, V K & Srinivasan, T N, 1969. "Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(6), pages 1005-1010, Nov./Dec..
    2. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
    3. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    4. Gene M. Grossman (ed.), 1992. "Imperfect Competition and International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570939, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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