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On the merger paradox and asymmetric product differentiation

Author

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  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Tetsuya Nakajima

    (Faculty of Economics, Osaka City University)

Abstract

Assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we reconsider the merger paradox in the cases of quantity-setting and price-setting games. We investigate whether emergence of the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation of the outsider, irrespective of the mode of competition. In particular, being different from the result of Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we show that the merger paradox arises in the case of price-setting games if the degree of product differentiation of the outsider is sufficiently small.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu & Tetsuya Nakajima, 2018. "On the merger paradox and asymmetric product differentiation," Discussion Paper Series 173, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Feb 2018.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:173
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Judy Hsu & X. Henry Wang, 2010. "Horizontal Mergers In A Differentiated Cournot Oligopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 305-314, July.
    2. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    3. Aviv Nevo, 2000. "Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 395-421, Autumn.
    4. J. Alejandro Gelves, 2014. "Differentiation and Cost Asymmetry: Solving the Merger Paradox," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 321-340, November.
    5. Anthony Creane & Carl Davidson, 2004. "Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 951-977, November.
    6. Baker, Jonathan B & Baresnahan, Timothy F, 1985. "The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-differentiated Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 427-444, June.
    7. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu & Tetsuya Nakajima, 2021. "On the “merger paradox” in price competition with asymmetric product differentiation," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 153-162, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    merger paradox; quantity-setting game; price-setting game; asymmetric product differentiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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