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Wholesale Transactions under Economies and Diseconomies of Scope in Search Activities in a Model of Search and Match

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  • Shigeru Makioka

    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University)

Abstract

In a basic model of search and match, thanks to the assumption that producer-sellers and consumer-buyers pay constant search costs per one unit of a single type of goods, it suffices to consider the retail transactions between producer-sellers and consumer-buyers. We extend this model to allow for the possibilities of economies and diseconomies of scopes in search activities over two types goods. We show that producer-sellers make wholesale transactions with one another when the benefit of economies of scope is strong enough. But when the benefit of economies of scope in search activities for buyers compensates the loss of diseconomies of scope in search activities for sellers, there are multiple equilibria: Matched pairs of producer-sellers always make wholesale transactions in one equilibrium. But they never make those in another, so that there only are retail transactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Shigeru Makioka, 2015. "Wholesale Transactions under Economies and Diseconomies of Scope in Search Activities in a Model of Search and Match," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2015-006, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    • Handle: RePEc:keo:dpaper:2015-006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlson, John A. & McAfee, R. Preston, 1984. "Joint search for several goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 337-345, April.
    2. Burdett, Kenneth & Malueg, David A., 1981. "The theory of search for several goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 362-376, June.
    3. Alok Johri & John Leach, 2002. "Middlemen and the Allocation of Heterogeneous Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 347-362, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    search and match; economies of scope; wholesale transaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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