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From Mubarak to Sisi: The Evolution of Authoritarian Rule in Egypt

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  • Darwisheh,Housam

Abstract

This study examines the evolution of authoritarian governance in Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, contrasting it with his predecessor Hosni Mubarak’s dominant-party electoral authoritarianism. Following the January 25 Revolution and Mubarak’s ousting in 2011, Egypt experienced a brief period of democratization before the 2013 military coup installed Sisi as president. Unlike Mubarak’s reliance on a dominant party, Sisi’s regime consolidates power through state institutions, particularly the military, judiciary, and religious authorities. Using a qualitative comparative case study approach, this research draws on primary and secondary sources to analyze the mechanisms of regime stability and authoritarian consolidation. To contextualize its findings, this study applies the theoretical frameworks of electoral authoritarianism, strongman politics, and institutional legitimacy. Findings indicate that Sisi has supplanted Mubarak’s party-centered model with a multifaceted strategy characterized by legal manipulation, institutional cooptation, and the depoliticization of the public sphere, aimed at suppressing political discourse and neutralizing potential spaces for opposition and dissent. This research provides crucial insights into the adaptability of authoritarian regimes and their impact on Egypt’s political trajectory.

Suggested Citation

  • Darwisheh,Housam, 2024. "From Mubarak to Sisi: The Evolution of Authoritarian Rule in Egypt," IDE Discussion Papers 948, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
  • Handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper948
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    Keywords

    Electoral authoritarianism|institutional legitimacy|military dominance|regime consolidation|depoliticization;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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