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A Rent-Seeking Perspective on Imperial Peace

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  • Dasgupta, Indraneel

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

We model a rent-seeking contest among two 'identity ideologues', differentially located along a uni-dimensional identity continuum, and a 'mercenary', who can choose any location in-between. The contest jointly awards an identity-relevant good ('religion') and an identity-irrelevant good ('money'). The mercenary values only money, the ideologues value both money and religion. The ideologues are worse off, at an increasing rate, when the winner is located farther away. We show that, under reasonable restrictions, the following hold. A decline in the mercenary's cost of contest effort reduces conflict. Both ideologues lose in success probability, but gain in expected utility. Elimination of the mercenary increases conflict and makes the ideologues more successful yet worse off. Our results rationalize 'imperial peace' – long periods of stability and social peace in multi-ethnic empires, and explain why the weakening and breakdown of such empires is often associated with a sharp rise in ethnic violence within their territories.

Suggested Citation

  • Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2024. "A Rent-Seeking Perspective on Imperial Peace," IZA Discussion Papers 17312, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Indraneel Dasgupta & Ranajoy Guha Neogi, 2018. "Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 315-334, March.
    2. Toshihiro Ihori, 2000. "Defense Expenditures and Allied Cooperation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-68, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking contest; identitarian distance; ethnic conflict; imperial peace; decolonization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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