Voting as a War of Attrition
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- Kwiek, Maksymilian & Marreiros, Helia & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2019. "Voting as a war of attrition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 104-121.
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Cited by:
- Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2023. "Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation And Obstruction," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 757-781, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
voting; intensity of preferences; supermajority; conclave; war of attrition; communication;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2018-07-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2018-07-23 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2018-07-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2018-07-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2018-07-23 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2018-07-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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