A Model Of Immigration, Integration And Cultural Transmission Of Social Norms
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Cited by:
- Friederike Mengel & Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Group Selection With Imperfect Separation - An Experiment," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 608-623, September.
- Spichtig, Mathias & Traxler, Christian, 2007. "Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation," Discussion Papers in Economics 1398, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Cultural Evolution; Game Theory; Social Norms; Cooperation; Population Viscosity.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2006-06-17 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-06-17 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2006-06-17 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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