IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ivi/wpasad/2002-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Network Formation And Anti-Coordination Games

Author

Listed:
  • Dunia López-Pintado

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Fernando Vega Redondo

    (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas)

  • Sanjeev Goyal

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Yann Bramoulle

    (Université de Toulouse)

Abstract

We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games -- games where a player's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. We characterize the nature of equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both the network architecture and the induced behavior are crucially dependent on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, the equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient. This conclusion continues to hold if the population game is embedded in a standard evolutionary model of learning, since all equilibria turn out to be stochastically stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Dunia López-Pintado & Fernando Vega Redondo & Sanjeev Goyal & Yann Bramoulle, 2002. "Network Formation And Anti-Coordination Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2002-25.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2002
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256.
    3. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
    5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April.
    8. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
    9. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Goyal, Sanjeev, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers 9983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    3. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    4. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS," Working Papers 2009-2, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2021. "Free Neighborhood Choice Boosts Socially Optimal Outcomes in Stag-Hunt Coordination Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 9012, CESifo.
    6. Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
    7. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    8. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    9. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Michael Kosfeld, "undated". "Network Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 152, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    12. Susan Lee, 1999. "Assortative Interactions and Endogenous Stratification," Working Papers 99-08-056, Santa Fe Institute.
    13. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    14. Robles, Jack, 1998. "Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 207-223, April.
    15. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2009. "Rapid evolution under inertia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 865-879, July.
    16. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 397-411.
    17. Fulin Guo, 2023. "Experience-weighted attraction learning in network coordination games," Papers 2310.18835, arXiv.org.
    18. Pin, Paolo & Weidenholzer, Elke & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2017. "Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 165-175.
    19. Suren Basov, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior in the Global Economy: The Replicator Dynamics with Migration," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 847, The University of Melbourne.
    20. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Departamento de Edición (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ievages.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.