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Reservation Price Announcement In Sealed Bid Auctions: Comment

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  • John R. SCHROETER

Abstract

This comment corrects some errors of analysis contained in a 1993 paper by Carey in the Journal of Industrial Economics.

Suggested Citation

  • John R. SCHROETER, 1996. "Reservation Price Announcement In Sealed Bid Auctions: Comment," Staff Papers 282, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:isuesp:282
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    as
    1. Carey, Kathleen, 1993. "Reservation Price Announcements in Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 421-429, December.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    4. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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    Keywords

    auction; reservation price;

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