IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genstf/197510010700001021.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Shapley Value And Lindahl Equilibrium For An Economy With A Public Good: An Example

Author

Listed:
  • Gardner, Roy

Abstract

In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem of value and distribution: pure competition (competitive equilibrium), coalition power (the core), and fair division (the Shapley value) [5]. In an economy without public goods but with a continuum of agents, all three approaches are equivalent, in the sense that they lead to the same allocation of goods and the same imputation of utility [1, 2]. For an economy with public goods, competitive equilibrium is replaced by the analogous concept of Lindahl equilibrium, the other approaches remaining the same.

Suggested Citation

  • Gardner, Roy, 1975. "Shapley Value And Lindahl Equilibrium For An Economy With A Public Good: An Example," ISU General Staff Papers 197510010700001021, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:197510010700001021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/4914f20b-2d43-4600-8a4c-82d064f85d44/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aumann, Robert J, 1975. "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 611-646, July.
    2. Muench, Thomas J., 1972. "The core and the Lindahl equilibrium of an economy with a public good: an example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 241-255, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richter, Marcel K. & Wong, K.-C.Kam-Chau, 2004. "Concave utility on finite sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 341-357, April.
    2. Omer Edhan, 2012. "Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies," Discussion Paper Series dp629, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, April.
    4. John P. Conley, 2024. "Information economies with taste diversity and bounded attention spans," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 73(3), pages 1175-1207, October.
    5. Gabriel Desgranges & Sayantan Ghosal, 2021. "Heterogeneous beliefs and approximately self-fulfilling outcomes," Working Papers 2021_07, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1990. "The Existence of Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium a la Wicksteed," UCLA Economics Working Papers 606, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Marakulin, V.M., 2013. "On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 189-200.
    8. Ben-Shahar, Danny & Deng, Yongheng & Sulganik, Eyal, 2009. "Property appraisal in high-rises: A cooperative game theory approach," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 25-33, March.
    9. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1976. "Lindahl's solution and values for a public-goods example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 37-41, March.
    10. Isabel Cairó & Jae W. Sim, 2020. "Market Power, Inequality, and Financial Instability," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1999. "Fine value allocations in large exchange economies with differential information," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6128, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    12. Faias, Marta & Moreno, Emma & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "A Strategic market game approach for the private provision of public goods," MPRA Paper 37777, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Mar 2012.
    13. Swanenberg, A.J.M., 1981. "Rationing and price dynamics in a simple market-game," Research Memorandum FEW 97, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Alexis Anagnostopoulos & Eva Carceles‐Poveda & Yair Tauman, 2021. "Value Preserving Welfare Weights For Social Optimization Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1627-1653, November.
    15. Emilio Calvo, 2008. "Random marginal and random removal values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 533-563, December.
    16. Cairó, Isabel & Sim, Jae, 2023. "Monetary policy and financial stability," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    17. Tauman, Yair & Chen, Yan, 2000. "Acceptable and Walrasian allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 415-438, November.
    18. , & , P. & , & ,, 2015. "Strategic uncertainty and the ex-post Nash property in large games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    19. Trout Rader, 1973. "An economic approach to social choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 49-75, June.
    20. Zili Yang, 2017. "Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 9-28, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:197510010700001021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Curtis Balmer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.