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Relative Efficiency of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Environmental Regulations (The)

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  • Wu, JunJie
  • Babcock, Bruce A.

Abstract

Increased use of voluntary programs for environmental protection as an alternative to mandatory approaches raises the issue of the relative efficiency of the two approaches. This paper analyzes the efficiency of voluntary programs relative to mandatory programs in agriculture. Under the voluntary program producers adopt a land conservation practice and, in turn, the government provides technical and financial assistance. The voluntary program is more efficient than a program that mandates adoption if and only if the deadweight losses of government expenditures under the voluntary program are less than the difference between private and public costs of government services plus the additional implementation costs of the mandatory program. This necessary and sufficient condition is more likely to be satisfied when (a) the deadweight loss from raising government revenue is zero or small, (b) government services are less rival, (c) the costs of government services are lower than what farmers would have to pay for equivalent private services, (d) the number of farms in the program is large, and (e) the saving in implementation costs under the voluntary program is large and increases rapidly with program acreage.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1999. "Relative Efficiency of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Environmental Regulations (The)," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1014, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1014
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    Cited by:

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    2. Khanna, Madhu & Isik, Murat & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Cost-effectiveness of alternative green payment policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 157-174, August.
    3. Barry D. Solomon & Shan Zhou, 2021. "Renewable Portfolio Standards: Do Voluntary Goals vs. Mandatory Standards Make a Difference?," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 38(2), pages 146-163, March.
    4. Juutinen, Artti & Mäntymaa, Erkki & Ollikainen, Markku, 2013. "Landowners’ conservation motives and the size of information rents in environmental bidding systems," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 128-148.
    5. Feng, Hongli & Kling, Catherine L. & Kurkalova, Lyubov A. & Secchi, Silvia, 2007. "Cac Versus Incentive-Based Instruments in Agriculture: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10796, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Strauss, Peter & Leone, Antonio & Ripa, Maria & Turpin, Nadine & Lescot, Jean-Marie & Laplana, Ramon, 2006. "Using critical source areas for targeting cost-effective best management practices to mitigate phosphorus and sediment transfer at the watershed scale," MPRA Paper 66256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Hongli Feng & Catherine L. Kling & Lyubov A. Kurkalova & Silvia Secchi, 2003. "Subsidies! The Other Incentive-Based Instrument: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp345, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    8. Juutinen, Artti & Mantymaa, Erkki & Monkkonen, Mikko & Svento, Rauli, 2008. "Voluntary agreements in protecting privately owned forests in Finland -- To buy or to lease," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 230-239, February.

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